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As it looks for now, at the time of writing in summer of 2019, the UK will most 
probably leave the EU. This Project’s main goal is to study existing trade relations 
between the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country (ACBC) and the United 
Kingdom (UK) and their origin, and roughly estimate what tariffs Basque companies 
trading with a UK that left the community must expect. Another important objective is 
to study economic and political reasons for UK’s special role in the European 
Community since becoming a member, including a theoretical approach to economic 
integration and the evolution of the EU.  
My analysis has shown that the UK is an important trade partner for the ACBC, being 
found among the top five partner countries in exports and imports during most of the 
recent years. Different sectors will be affected very differently by tariffs.  Further I have 
found out that any kind of Brexit will economically harm not only the UK but also 
every single remaining EU member state. Ireland will be most affected, even more than 

















The outcome of the Brexit referendum in June 2016 was a shock for the European Union 
(EU) and for many British too. How did it come so far? What were the political and 
economic consequences of the referendum and the Brexit threat? And what could be the 
consequences for the United Kingdom (UK), the European Union, for the European 
members and especially for the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country (ACBC) 
if it really comes down to it and the United Kingdom leaves the community?  
This Project intends to advance in the understanding of the historical factors that fuelled 
process of the Brexit and to analyse the potential economic effects that the UK leave could 
have for the ACBC.  
The structure of the Project is as follows: The first part is dedicated to the history of trade 
relations between the UK, the ACBC and Europe, with a theoretical approach to economic 
integration linked to the history of the EU. The focus lies on the peculiarities of the UK 
in the European integration process.  
In the second part, I will analyse political reactions and the evolution of currencies, stocks 
and GDP since  the first Brexit threats came up in early 2013, and find out how or if 
important news (for example, the agreement in 2018 between London and Brussels on a 
transition period) affected these important indicators of performance of an economy.  
In the third part, the goal is to find out what effects different Brexit scenarios could have 
on tariffs for trade between the ACBC and the UK. In a first step, total and sectoral trade 
of recent years is analysed. Then, based on these results, I calculate expected tariffs in a 
Hard Brexit and a Soft Brexit scenario to see how these tariffs affect differently the 
Basque and British companies in each sector. Finally, the main conclusions of this Project 








Chapter 1: Origin of economic relations between the Basque Country and the 
United Kingdom 
 
In any period of history, commercial relations between two countries depend to a great 
scale on the political-diplomatic relations between them. That is why first, I want to look 
at the political relations between Spain and the United Kingdom1 in each period. Then I 
will relate them to the economic situation at the time in order to understand the 
commercial effects they had between the two countries. Although the history of their 
political-economic relations is not the central topic of the present Project, I think that it is 
important to summarize it briefly as a necessary step towards greater understanding of 
their relation today.  
 
1.1 Seventeenth and eighteenth century (1667 – 1796) 
During this period, Spain and the British Islands were both friends and enemies, and 
fought several wars against each other, mostly at sea. The basic source of conflict was the 
Spanish quasi-monopoly in the Americas, and England constantly seeking foreign 
markets for the products of its important manufacturing sector (Zabala, 1983). To get a 
rough overview of this time, it is important to mention three events: The Anglo-Spanish 
conflict and the Lord Sandwich - Treaty (1654-1667), the War of the Spanish Succession 
 
1 I use the terminology “The United Kingdom” for the Kingdom of Great Britain (1707 – 1801), 
consisting of England (including Wales) and Scotland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland (1801 – 1922) and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (1922 – 
present). For earlier mentions than 1707 of the area of England, Wales and Scotland, I use the 




and the Peace of Utrecht (1701-1715) and the development of tension in the second half 
of the century, culminating in the Anglo-Spanish war (1796 – 1808). 
The Treaty of Madrid (1667) between Spain and England, also called the Lord Sandwich-
Treaty, was the first step to end the Anglo-Spanish conflict going on since 1654. The 
British received the status of most favoured nation; they were granted to pay the same 
tariff rates as the Dutch and French and, gained an immunity to ship inspections off coast 
and in Spanish ports. These privileges where confirmed and extended within the treaties 
of the Peace of Utrecht (1712 -1715): British exporters would pay a volume-based tax 
(called palmeo) and in no case would pay more duties than the Spanish. Among other 
concessions in the Americas, they were very convenient for the British traders and seen 
as price the Spanish King Phillip V paid for British diplomatic support in Italy. (Kuethe 
and Andrien, 2014). 
The Treaty of 1667 allowed the British to export any kind of goods from England and its 
colonies to Spain. Except for the periods of war and other short interruptions, these 
permissions lasted until 1767, when the Spanish government started to prohibit importing 
British cotton, linen, beer and other goods of high interest for the British exporters 
(Zabala, 1983). This process of increasing trade restriction continued until the beginning 
of the Anglo-Spanish war in 1796. 
The most important goods exported from Spain to Great Britain were wine, wool and 
colourants. These three products made up to 70% of all exportations by the end of the 
century. The most imported goods were manufactured woollen products, which 
represented 65 % of all imports from Great Britain by the end of the century. Very little 
can be said about specific importance of the Basque country within this trade. The north 
of Spain only played a major role in the exportation of wool, and importation of drapery-
products (Zabala, 1983). 
At this time, the Basque coast had nine commercial ports. Five of them were in Vizcaya: 
Bilbao, Portugalete, Bermeo, Palencia and Mundaka; and four in Gipuzkoa: Guetaria, San 
Sebastian, Pasajes and Fuenterrabia (Zabala 1983).  The most important, certainly were 
Bilbao and San Sebastian, although there are some difficulties among historians 




1983). In England, the most important harbours in the trade with Spain at the time were 
London, Bristol, Liverpool and Exeter. In 1790, approximately 365 ships were bringing 
40.000 tons of goods from Spain to Great Britain, and 230 ships 230.000 tons the other 
way around. (Zabala, 1983). Bear in mind that these figures correspond to a particular 
year, in which the trade already suffered of political restrictions (see above).  
 
1.2 Nineteenth century (1796 – 1914) 
In the first half of the 19th century, political relations between Spain and the United 
Kingdom were very difficult. In this period took place the Anglo-Spanish war (ongoing 
since 1796), the battle of Trafalgar in 1805 (where the Royal Navy destroyed the Spanish-
French Armada, securing its predominance on world`s oceans until the Second World 
War), the Napoleon Wars and the Congress of Vienna 1814-1815, the British intervention 
in the Spanish Carlist Wars, and a rupture of diplomatic relations in 1848. The second 
half of the century was completely different: diplomacy was re-established in 1850, and 
there were no major political problems anymore between the two countries for the rest of 
the century (Nadal, 1978). 
Economically, the United Kingdom turned into the first industrialized power of the world. 
Its fast-growing production industries demanded imports of raw material from all over 
the world, especially raw minerals. Production capacity exceeded the national demand, 
requiring the United Kingdom to assure that her products could be sold in foreign markets 
(Nadal, 1978). This economic expansion and the control of the world´s oceans after the 
battle of Trafalgar allowed her to take over most commercial relations with the former 
Spanish colonies from Spain.  
In the beginning of the century, most important British exports to Spain were still 
manufactured textiles of cotton, wool and linen, but its relevance was in decline: While 
they summed up to 52% of all exports in 1815, they represented only 20 % in 1845. This 
official data can be explained by the developing Catalan textile industry, which made 
Spain less dependent of British textiles, and by the increasing British smuggling through 




pottery and machinery, especially from 1840, and sometime later steam engines (Nadal 
1978). The effects of the industrial revolution in England started to spread all over 
Europe, including Spain.  
Spain was left without significant military and commercial fleet after the battle of 
Trafalgar and was unable to compete with the United Kingdom (Nadal, 1978). In the first 
half of the century, the most exported goods to the United Kingdom were wine (up to 31 
% of all exports in 1838), wool, raisins, mercury and saltwort. On average, these five 
goods counted for 73 % of all annual exports to the United Kingdom between 1815 and 
1846. Wool and saltwort lost importance until the mid of century, while wine, mercury 
and lead gained. Other products of relevance to mention were olive oil, oranges and 
lemons (Nadal, 1978). 
In the second half of the century, the British supremacy forced Spain into the position of 
consumer of its industrial products, and into provider of raw material and agricultural 
products. According to Nadal (1978), the British interest in maintaining this established 
semi-dependence slowed down industrial development in Spain, delaying it for years.  
In this period, coal, machinery, ironware and textiles were the most important British 
exports to Spain. The coal was shipped in increasing amounts, gaining especial 
importance: 37.320 tons were exported in 1841, over one million tons from 1882 on and 
two million tons by the end of the century. By then, it counted for almost one quarter of 
all exports. A lot of British coal was shipped to the Basque Country (port of Bilbao) and 
was fundamental for the developing Basque iron and steel industry (Nadal, 1978).  
The second half of the 19th century is also characterized by the spread of the industrial 
revolution to other European countries. Textile products from Belgium, France and 
Germany entered the Spanish market causing British exports of these products to drop 
down, especially in the period from 1877 to 1886 where Spain established a 
discriminating tax on British products (in consequence of a disagreement on the taxation 
of Spanish wine).  
As noted above, Spanish exports to the United Kingdom in the second half of the 19th 




together represented more than 60% of all exports, with a maximum of 91% in the year 
of 1886. Of especial importance within the mineral exportation was iron from the Basque 
country: numbers increase constantly from 350.000 tons in 1876, to over one million in 
1878, two million in 1880 and up to 5 million in 1899. From 1878 to 1893, there were 







Chapter 2: Theoretical considerations on economic integration and different 
approaches to it in post war Europe  
 
The European Union as it is at the time of writing in spring 2019, is the current picture of 
a democratic peace and economic project in constant transformation and expansion (and 
since the possible exit of the United Kingdom, of reduction too), starting its integration 
process shortly after the Second World War. It helped decisively to abolish the last 
military dictatorships in western Europe (in Spain, Portugal and Greece) and as there were 
no military confrontation within its area, it has been fully successful regarding to its peace 
mission. As an economic and political project, there is certainly more discussion. There 
have always been different approaches on how to organize and integrate the economies 
of Europe’s nations since the Second World War. The goal of any integration process is 
to raise economic relations between the participating countries, and every successful 
process of integration manages to let all participating countries win, although it is certain 
that some countries will beneficiate more than others (Fenández, 2006).  
According to Donato Fernández Navarrete (2006), there are five modalities in any 
economic integration process:  
1. Free-trade area 
2. Customs union 
3. Common or single market 
4. Economic and monetary union 
5. Total integration (economic and political union) 
In a free-trade area, customs tariffs are abolished between the member states, but each 
one of them maintains its tariffs on products from non-member states, independently from 
the rest. The main problem of this type of integration is controlling the origin of products: 




or this member state was only used by an outside state to introduce the product into the 
free-trade area (because a lower tariff is applied).  
In addition to the free circulation of products, member states of a customs union have 
agreed on one common system of tariffs for all products from non-member states. This 
common tariff is a fundamental difference to the free-trade area. Fernandez (2006) sees 
the customs union as first step in the integration process, pulling hard for the next ones: 
the common market and then the monetary union. 
In the common market, the second step of the integration, free circulation of services, 
capital and work are added to the free circulation of products. Common regulations and 
harmonization of law between the member states are established, requiring supra-national 
institutions.  
In the third step, the economic and monetary union, the creation of a common currency 
finishes the economic integration process. The national currencies of member states are 
converted completely and irreversibly into the new, common one. A supra-national 
institution is created to manage monetary affairs.  
Without doubts, the most difficult step is the last one, the economic and political union. 
It implies transferring more and more powers from national governments to common 
institutions. Therefore, it is a very difficult and complex phase. Fernández (2006) points 
out that, if the process of the integration stops with the monetary union, it is most likely 
to collapse at some point, because the political disintegration sets too many obstacles to 
de development of the economy.  
After the Second World War in Europe, there was one big question: How to re-organize 
economic relation within (western-) Europe and assure that the catastrophe of two world 
wars would not occur again? When the Europe Congress came together in May 1948, 
there were probably as many answers to this question as participants (more than 800 
delegates were present).  
Over the decade to come, two groups of nations evolved: The most ambitious group made 
up of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and the Netherlands was willing to 




This group was known as the inner six. It founded the European Economic Community 
(EEC) in 1957, the origin of modern-day European Union (see chart 1: milestones of the 
European Union Integration). 
The less ambitious group was formed by Austria, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Norway 
and Sweden. These countries were sceptic about a single European market or, at least 
about the step prior to it, the costums union. They founded the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) in 1960 and they were often referred to as the outer seven (see chart 
2). As the name suggests, their goal did not exceed the free trade area, modality 1 of the 
integration process as described above. In its beginnings, the EFTA worked well too, but 
at the end of the 60s, the success of the EEC became visible. In particular, the United 
Kingdom realized that the higher economic growth among the member states of the EEC 
was related to their closer agreements and, consequently the United Kingdom became 
interested in joining it. “EFTA was heavily trade creating, but the EEC promoted intrabloc 
trade through a combination of trade creation and trade diversion” (Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen, 1997, p. 162). This performance induced more and more countries to leave 
the EFTA and join the EEC, or then called European Communities (EC). Today, only 
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Switzerland and Norway remain members of EFTA, and because 
of the establishment of the European Economic Area (EEA)2 in 1992, the EFTA really is 






2 The EEA is an international agreement from 1992, enabling the extension of the EU’s single 
market to non-member states. It linked EU with EFTA, exempting Switzerland which remains 





Chart 1: Milestones of the European Union integration process 
Source: Own elaboration from data provided by the official website of the European Union and 
Wikipedia.org 
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Chart 2: Overview timeline of European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 
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Chapter 3: The European Union and the United Kingdom 
 
3.1 Evolution of the European Union  
The process of building the European Union was (and is) extremely complex and is 
beyond the main aim of this Project. I just want to explain the most important basics of 
the process, which are, in my opinion, relevant to gain understanding on the role played 
by the United Kingdom in the integration process that will be explained in the following 
chapters. 
Five major landmarks in the evolutionary process of the European integration are worth 
highlighting:  
 The foundation of the European Economic Community in 1958,  
 The achievement to become a Customs Union in 1968,  
 The establishment of the European Monetary System (EMS)3 in 1979,  
 The establishment of the single market in 1993 and, 
 The economic and monetary union in 1999.  
These landmarks match exactly the first, second and third stages of the theoretical 
approach to the integration process as described above. They were made possible by the 
following, most important treaties: The treaties of Rome or EEC Treaty of 1957, the 
Single European Act of 1986 and the Maastricht Treaty of 1992.  
The treaties of Amsterdam (effective 1999), Nice (2003) and Lisbon (2009) are leading 
towards raising the European Union up to the last and most difficult stage, the economic 
 
3 The EMS was an ensemble of agreements to achieve monetary stability in Europe, including the 
introduction of the Exchange Rate Mechanism, a semi-pegged system (fixing currency exchange 




and political union. Especially the Treaty of Lisbon (in force at the time of writing) is 
celebrated and criticized heavily for its accomplishment to do so.  
1) The Treaty of Rome is signed by the inner six in 1957, founding the European 
Economic Community (EEC) and is often seen as the pre-elementary economic 
constitution of the modern European Union. It is primarily characterized by aims 
and principles, such as the will to harmonize development of economic activities, 
continuous expansion, accelerating the raising of the standard of living, community 
loyalty and non-discrimination of nations. It also determines two overall objectives: 
the forming of a single market and the approximation of economic policies, 
although the two concepts remain undefined (Pelkmans, 1997). 
2) The Single European Act of 1986 is signed by the former inner six and Denmark, 
Ireland and the United Kingdom, which joined the European Communities (EC)4 
in 1973, and Greece, Portugal and Spain (joined in 1981and 1986, respectively). 
This Act strengthened the economic constitution established in Rome almost 20 
years before and enhanced getting under way the single market by adding, among 
others, five important points to Rome: 
“All five critical additions to the Treaty (of Rome, N.B.) have a 
bearing on this effort to ‘complete’ the internal market. All other 
additions were either codifications or provisions of marginal 
importance. Those five additions were: 
- Far more qualified majority voting (QMV) on internal 
market matters 
- An explicit, unambiguous definition of the internal market 
 
4 In 1965, the Merger Treaty joined the three legislative and administrative bodies of the European 
Economic Community (EEC), the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) to form the European Communities (EC), with a 




- Mutual recognition as a regulatory principle 
- Approximation of health and safety in the workplace 
- Economic and social cohesion” (Pelkmans, 1997, p.38). 
The internal market was defined in article 13 of the act, as an area without frontiers 
and free movement of goods, persons, services and capital5. The same article also 
established a deadline of 31st of December 1992 to get this done, which shows the 
true determination the participating nations had to succeed.  
3) The Maastricht Treaty, or Treaty on the European Union, is signed in 1992 and 
is probably the most known treaty of all mentioned so far. This is because it had a 
big impact on people’s life. It modified the previous treaties by adding a third 
general objective: The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), bringing the 
community from step two of the integration process to step three.6 A second crucial 
point was the change of the term “approximating economic policies” into “common 
policies or activities”. These two cruxes of Maastricht (Pelkmanns 1997) resulted 
in the creation of the Euro, introduced in 1999 as demand deposit and 2002 in cash, 
the creation of the European Central Bank, the empowerment of the European 
Parliament, among other changes. It closed or finished the process of the economic 
integration and opened the way to the political one (Fernández 2006), founding the 
 
5 The exact words of the definition in article 13 are: The internal market shall comprise an area 
without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is 
ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. Retrieved from https://eur-
lex.europa.eu 
6 In fact, the EMU was created in 1990, but its agreements were consolidated and incorporated 




European Union. To protect national interests, the principle of subsidiarity7 is 
introduced within this Treaty, too. 
The EMU was planned to develop in three stages. The first one started on the 1st of 
January 1990 by abolishing all restrictions of capital movement within member 
states. The committee of governors of the national central banks was given more 
tasks on coordination of monetary policies, with the final goal to increase price 
stability.  
The second stage (1994 – 1999) is characterized by the creation of the European 
Monetary Institute (EMI) in 1994 and the European Central Bank (ECB) in 1998. 
The main tasks of the EMI were the strengthening of central bank cooperation, 
monetary policy coordination and preparations for the third stage, especially the 
setting up of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB)8. With the 
establishment of the ECB, the EMI was liquidated.  
The third stage of the EMU is taking place since 1999. It started with the 
implementation of the ESCB, the irrevocable fixing of exchange rates from the 
 
7 The principle of subsidiarity is very important in the EU. It regulates the competence division 
in certain areas between member states and Brussels, assuring member states power and thus 
helping to fulfil a principle goal of the EU: to exercise powers as close as possible to the citizens.  
According to the European parliament, the principle “… governs the exercise of the EU’s 
competences. In areas in which the European Union does not have exclusive competence, the 
principle of subsidiarity seeks to safeguard the ability of the Member States to take decisions and 
action and authorises intervention by the Union when the objectives of an action cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States, but can be better achieved at Union level, ‘by reason 
of the scale and effects of the proposed action’. The purpose of including a reference to the 
principle in the EU Treaties is also to ensure that powers are exercised as close to the citizen as 
possible, in accordance with the proximity principle referred to in Article 10(3) of the Treaty of 
the European Union (TEU)”. 
8 The ESCB consists of the ECB and all national central banks of EU member states, regardless 




currencies of the 11 participating member states (Belgium, Germany, Spain, 
France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Finland) 
to the single currency called Euro, its introduction and the conduct of a single 
monetary policy under the responsibility of the ECB9. It is obligatory for the EU 
member states to participate in stage three, all new members must commit to 
accomplish the participation. The United Kingdom and Denmark are exempted of 
this obligation, by having negotiated opt-outs in their correspondent EU-Treaties10. 
Another special case is the member state Sweden. One requirement to join the 
Eurozone is to be member of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II)11 for at least 
two years. Sweden does not want to enter ERM II, and therefore stays with its 
national currency. The obligation mentioned above is questionable; it seems that 
the European Union has accepted that Sweden does not participate in the Eurozone. 
In a hearing held by the European Parliament on the 12th of January 2010, Olli Rehn, 
then Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs stated, “it is up to the 
Swedish people to decide on this issue”.12 
4) The Treaty of Amsterdam (effective in 1999) and the Treaty of Nice (effective 
in 2003) were more of political character and are in general seen as failures 
(especially Amsterdam) as not reaching objectives. With the Amsterdam Treaty, 
the European parliament was again empowered, giving it the right to participate in 
ordinary legislative procedures by lifting it on the same level as the council of the 
European Union. In addition, the objective of the “area of freedom, security and 
 
9 All information on the three stages is extracted from the official website of the ECB, 
www.ecb.europa.eu 
10 For a closer look on the opt-outs, see section 3.2 The United Kingdom and the European 
integration. 
11 The ERM II replaced the ERM to set currency exchange rates of non-euro member states against 
the Euro. Like ERM, it´s a semi-pegged system. 




justice” was defined and the Schengen Agreement was included into the Treaty. 
With Nice, reforms of the European institutions were accomplished. These reforms 
were necessary for the coming enlargement of the union to the east and primarily 
affected the division of power between member states by redistributing number of 
commissioners, the votes in the council and seats in the parliament corresponding 
to each one of them. Apart from this, the Treaty of Nice hardly contributes 
something new, except for extending the Qualified Majority Voting on certain 
issues (Fernandez 2006).  
5) The Treaty of Lisbon, signed in 2007 and in force since 2009, was a complete 
success. It amended the Treaty of Nice. It reduced the high amount of unanimity 
requirements, widening the qualified majority voting and introducing the double 
majority in a lot of decision-making processes. Especially in the area of justice and 
home affairs, the national veto rights are abolished. Again, the European Parliament 
is empowered, the common foreign and security policies are strengthened, and the 
distribution of power within the European Council is reorganized: new numbers of 
votes are assigned to the governments of the member-states, following more 
accurately the proportion of their population within the Union. Supporters of the 
Treaty of Lisbon state that this puts the Union on a broader democratic legitimation, 
while critics say that interest of the smaller nations could get endangered. It is sure 
that Lisbon increased the capacity to act of the EU significantly (Weidenfeld, 2013).  
By strengthening the positions of the president of the commission, the president of 
the European Council and the representative of the Common Foreign Security 
Policy, the Treaty of Lisbon gives faces to the EU, an important political factor for 
creating image. 
 
3.2 The United Kingdom and the European Integration 
The United Kingdom did not want to join the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) and did only sent middle-state diplomates to the negotiation in Rome in 1957, 




despite the new geopolitical situation deriving from the cold war and decolonialization. 
Their special and privileged relation with the USA allowed them to stay out of the 
community project at the beginning. And, when the United Kingdom finally joined the 
EC in 1973, it did so because of realizing that protecting its interests was easier from 
inside the community than from outside (De Areilza, 1996).  
In fact, the British realized this much earlier: just one year after forming the EFTA, they 
applied for the first time to enter the EEC in 1961, and another time in 1968. The British 
were observing the strong economic growth on mainland Europe, not to be reached within 
the EFTA13. The economic advantage of EC was undeniable. In addition, a generation of 
politicians who fought in Second World War was in power in the United Kingdom. They 
did see the EC as an important peace project too (Bar, 2017). 
However, Charles de Gaulle, then president of France at that time, vetoed against the 
United Kingdom to join the community, both times. He feared too much “Atlantic” or 
American influence through the United Kingdom on the European project. In addition, 
he saw the British economic structure hardly compatible with the one of the European 
participating countries, especially in terms of the agricultural sector (Bar, 2017). Only 
with the resignation of de Gaulle, the way was clear for the United Kingdom to enter and 
negotiations started in 1971. After difficult negotiations, the United Kingdom joined the 
EC together with Denmark and Ireland in 1973.  
After the joining of the United Kingdom and a change of government, a referendum was 
held in 1975 on maintaining in the EC. The question asked was: “Do you think the United 
Kingdom should stay in the European Community (the Common Market)?” It was clearly 
accepted by 67,2 %, yes votes. How the question was asked underlines a fundamental 
thing to understand the United Kingdom’s role in the European integration: The United 
Kingdom was never seeking a political union; it was only interested in the establishment 
of a European common market. Neither UK entered the EC because of willing to integrate 
 
13 The EFTA market would consist of about 90 million people, while the one of EC members 




nor for resolving the problems of nationalism, as did the inner six. It entered because of 
economic necessary (Bar, 2017).  
However, along its membership in the EC, and later EU, the United Kingdom made 
important contributions to the community project. It incorporated and executed new 
common European laws very fast, serving as a model state to others. It contributed to 
raise transparency in the common institutions and with the incorporation of the common 
law (the British law) into the European law, the position of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union was strengthened (de Areilza, 1996). 
But the United Kingdom maintained a special role throughout its entire membership, 
developing a constant Euroscepticism. It always tried to slow down the process of 
integration (Bar, 2016), always trying to keep as many competences as possible in 
London. So, where does this Euroscepticism come from?  
I found out that there are three possible, major reasons for it. The first reason is the 
historical perception of British people of their nation (nostalgy of the former world power, 
the most powerful European kingdom still existing, imperial romance etc). The UK is the 
only country of Europe that had never been invaded, had never suffered of a civil war and 
never had established a dictatorship. According to Mathieson (2016), these facts have an 
important impact on the social psychology of many British (and thus on their electoral 
behaviour).  
A second reason is a true different position within the world trade in comparison to the 
other nations of Europe, because of the Commonwealth of nations14, London as the most 
important financial centre of the world and, as mentioned above, the special relation to 
the USA. The third reason is the different structure of the economy of the UK, especially 
regarding the little importance of the agricultural sector. The most important 
 
14 During the second world war, the Commonwealth was an important source of finance for the 
UK. After the war, it imported most of its raw materials from commonwealth member states. With 
the approach to EC, the commonwealth lost importance. Nowadays, the Commonwealth is of no 




consequences of these reasons within the UK-EU relation are the famous UK-rebate, the 
five opting-outs and a special position within the Common Fishery Policy. 
1) The UK-rebate 
The most important element in the community budget has always been subventions 
to the agricultural sector of the member states. In the 1970ies and 80ies, they 
counted for approximately 70 % of the entire expenses of the community budget. 
In 2017, they remain the most important expenses, representing approximately 50 
% of all. But in the UK, the agricultural sector was and is very small in comparison 
to the other big community members like France or Italy. Therefore, the British 
successfully negotiated an economic compensation in 1975. Margaret Thatcher re-
negotiated in 1985, and the compensation became known as the UK-rebate15. A 
second argument of Thatcher was that the general wealth on the island at the time 
was less than on the mainland, and that the UK was a “Member state bearing an 
excessive budgetary burden in relation to its relative prosperity” (Bar, 2017).  
The UK-rebate is a compensation of complex calculation, which results in an 
approximately 66 % reduction of the British net-contribution16 to the community 
budget and is paid by the rest of the member states. For example, in 2017, the UK-
rebate was of 4.94 billion Euros, and the contribution of the UK to the EU budget 
was of 10.58 billion Euros after the rebate.17 
While the first argument, the little importance of agricultural subventions in the 
UK, is still widely accepted within the EU, the second one is not. The UK is now 
 
15 The UK-rebate is not the only economic compensation within member states. Other rebates 
exist or existed for Austria, Germany, Sweden and the Netherland, although in smaller scale. 
16 The net-contribution is the amount paid into the community budget minus the amount received 






one of the richest member states, and especially France, which is financing the 
biggest part of the UK-rebate, was calling for its abolition in the negotiations for 
the EU financial frameworks 2007-2013.  
2) Opt-outs 
In the law of the EU, member states have the possibility to negotiate “opt-outs” 
from community legislation or treaties. This means that they do not have to 
participate in the policy areas correspondents to the opt-out. At the time of writing, 
there are 10 opt-outs existing in the EU: the UK has 4, Denmark 3, Ireland 2 and 
Poland 1.  
The UK’s first opt-out was on the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty. It was 
negotiated by the Major Ministry before signing the Treaty. When coming into 
office, Tony Blair immediately abolished it in 1997.  
UK’s second opt-out, on the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), has also been 
secured in Maastricht. The decision of not participating in the EMU did not only 
mean to not adopt the Euro, it has other important consequences for the UK too: not 
participating in the elaboration process of the legislation for the EMU, not 
participating in the institutions of the Eurozone, in the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) etc (Bar, 2017). 
With her third opt-out, on the Schengen agreement, the UK secures her right to 
execute border control. Ireland joined the UK in adopting this opt-out, to keep the 
border to Northern Ireland open via the Common Travel Area (CTA) agreement. In 
the negotiation of the Brexit, this boarder is one of the most difficult problems to 
solve.  
The fourth UK opt-out refers to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and 
was secured in the negotiations of Lisbon. It pretends to assure that the Charter is 





UK’s fifth opt-out refers to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). With 
the Treaty of Lisbon, the unanimity vote requirement on matters of policies on 
border checks, asylum and immigration, and judicial cooperation in civil and 
criminal matters (of Title V of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union) 
is abandoned. Thus, the UK lost its possibility to veto, and negotiated, again 
successfully, an opt-out.   
3) Special position within the Common Fishery Policy (The Hague 
Preferences) 
The Common Fishery Policy (CFP) has its origin in the Treaty of Rome, back then 
as part of the agricultural policy. It was in the 1970s, with the joining of the UK, 
Ireland and Denmark to the Community, when the CFP got an own identity. The 
initial objectives of the CFP were the preservation of population of fish, the 
protection of marine environment, ensuring of a well-functioning European fishing 
fleet, and satisfying the market demand with quality products. 18 Nowadays, after 
various modifications and reformations (the most recent one in 2013), and 
according to the European Parliament, the CFP “… is meant to ensure that the 
activities of the fishing and aquaculture sectors are environmentally sustainable in 
the long term and are managed in a way that is consistent with the objectives of 
achieving economic, social and employment benefits”. The European Maritime and 
Fishery Fond (EMFF), with a budget of 6.400 million Euros for the period 2014 - 
2020, serves as important tool to achieve these goals. 19 
The CFP was an important subject in negotiating the joining of the UK, Denmark 
and Ireland in 1972, three countries with important fishing industries. Within these 
 
18 Information retrieved from the factsheet “The Common Fisheries Policy: origins and 
development” by the European Parliament: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/114/the-common-fisheries-policy-
origins-and-development, retrieved on 22.08.2019. 




negotiations, the principle of free access was abandoned: the zone where a member 
state had exclusive right to fish was extended from territorial waters (12 nautical 
miles off coast) to up to 200 nautical miles off coast, including the exclusive 
economic zones (EEZ).20 Significant changes in the CFP also occurred in the 1980: 
In 1983, the concept of relative stability, total allowable catches (TACs) and quotas 
were introduced. With the leaving of Greenland (1985), the joining of Spain and 
Portugal (1986) and the German reunification (1990), the structure, volume and 
capture capacity of the European fishing fleet changed, and the CFP had to adapt.  
With the extension for exclusive fishing to up to 200 nautical miles and the 
inclusion of the EEZ mentioned above, the UK assured that no other member state 
could fish under Community law within its traditional fishing grounds (the EEZ of 
the UK is the fifth largest in the world). Also, one of the key subjects in the UK’s 
access negotiations was how to control the fishing effort. It managed to reduce this 
community institution to a body of inspectors without legal right, only allowed to 
observe and collect information.  In 1976, the UK and Ireland achieved a special 
contract within the CPC, the Hague Preferences, allowing the UK and Ireland 
higher TAC for certain areas of high dependency of fishing. (Billón 1997, p. 231). 
To underline the importance of UK’ s fishing industry, I would like to analyse Table 
1 (next page). The biggest fishing industry within Europe has Spain with a total 
catch of 906.6 thousand tons in 2016, for instance, followed by Denmark (670.2 
thousand tons) and the UK with 701.7 thousand tons. However, the UK benefits 
lesser than proportional to the size of its industry from the EMFF (see appendix 
figure A2). For the period 2014-2020, the UK receives only 243.1 million Euro 
 
20 The concept of an EEZ is established by the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Article 
56 defines: In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has: (a) sovereign rights for the 
purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether 
living or non-living, of the waters suprajacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and 
with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as 




from it, after Spain (1,161.6 million), France (588 million), Italy (537.3 million), 
Poland (531.2 million), Portugal (392.5 million) and Greece (388,8 million).  
It should be mentioned that British fishermen are especially Eurosceptics. A 2016 
survey of the Scottish University of Aberdeen found out that 92 percent of British 
fishermen were going to vote for leaving the EU. More than three quarters of the 
fishermen believed leaving the EU would allow them to catch and land more fish 
and that not underlying the Common Fishery Policy would “greatly” (58 percent) 
or “somewhat” (34 percent) benefit them and their industry (McAgnus, 2016). 
 
Table 1: European fishing industry: catch per country in thousand tons 
Country 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Spain 921,6 981,5 1055,5 967,2 905,6 
Denmark 502,6 668,3 745,0 868,9 670,2 
United Kingdom 629,4 630,1 755,0 704,5 701,7 
France 429,5 468,8 495,1 484,2 504,3 
Netherlands 345,2 325,5 369,5 382,6 368,4 
Ireland 275,8 246,3 276,8 234,8 230,3 
Germany 198,5 219,0 227,0 240,4 250,5 
Portugal 197,9 196,0 182,9 188,5 184,6 
Italy 197,4 172,9 178,8 193,8 193,1 
Poland 179,7 195,5 172,9 187,1 199,7 
Sweden 150,1 176,8 171,9 202,9 198,0 
Finland 138,8 144,3 153,5 153,4 162,6 
Latvia 94,2 115,8 119,3 81,3 114,6 
Lithuania 65,4 89,4 148,8 83,7 105,7 
Estonia 63,3 66,6 64,7 70,5 72,5 
Greece 60,1 63,2 59,2 64,5 75,4 
Belgium 24,4 25,4 26,5 24,4 26,7 
Bulgaria 8,2 9,5 8,5 8,7 8,6 
Isle of Man 6,2 5,7 3,8 7,8 7,0 
Romania 0,8 1,6 2,2 4,8 6,8 
Channel Islands 3,0 2,8 3,0 2,6 3,0 
Malta 2,2 2,4 2,4 2,4 2,4 
Cyprus 1,3 1,2 1,3 1,5 1,5 
Slovenia 0,3 0,2 0,3 0,2 0,2 
Total 4496,1 4808,9 5223,9 5160,8 4993,4 







Chapter 4: What is the Brexit? 
 
On the 23rd of June 2016, the people of the UK were asked in a referendum to decide 
whether to stay in or to leave the European Union. They decided to leave. 
The outcome of the referendum was a shock for the EU, including for many British people 
(Morris et al., 2016). The word “Brexit” suddenly became a very serious and frequently 
used terminology. It is a portmanteau of Britain and exit, and was first used in 2012 by 
Peter Wilding, founder and director of the think tank British Influence.21 
Brexit’s denomination is about the only formally definition that can be found with 
certainty. It is impossible to find consent on what it really means beyond of leaving the 
EU, or how to leave the EU. It is not clear what Leave-voters voted for: there was no post-
vote plan for Brexit (Oliver, 2017). As of summer, 2019, at the time writing, this is the 
main problem in the House of Commons and the reason for its stalemate: there is no 
majority for any possibility of what Brexit should mean and how it should be done.  Oliver 
(2017) puts it in a nutshell: “It is likely that the confused outcome of the referendum and 
the technicalities of Brexit mean that for both the UK and the EU future relations will 
resemble fifty shades of grey rather than some black and white division of in or out”.  
On a legislation level, article 50 of the Treaty on the European Union regulates the 
withdrawal of a member state. The article22 states in paragraph one that any member state 
can exit the union, and in paragraph two that this state has to notify the European Council 
of its will to leave, which then shall negotiate an agreement with the leaving member 
 
21 Retrieved from the BBC webpage “The rise of the word Brexit” on 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-37896977, retrieved on 24.08.2019 




state, setting out the exit and future relationship, and approving them by qualified 
majority. Paragraph three states: “The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question 
from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years 
after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in 
agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this 
period.” The new prime minister of the UK, Theresa May, did notify the Council on 29 
of March 2017, which started the legal procedure and set the withdrawal date in 
accordance with article 50 on the 29 of March 2019. The problem was that no legally 
valid agreement could be settled until then: May did reach an agreement with the 
European Council, but she failed in getting the required majority approval for it in the 
House of Commons. The legal consequence of this fail would have been a withdrawal 
without any agreement, on day 29 of March. But the UK and the European Council 
(unanimously) agreed to postpone the two-years period mentioned in paragraph three of 
article 50 in a first step to the 22 of May (or earliest on 12 of April), and later to the 31 of 
October 2019. 
On the following pages I will analyse how it came to the referendum, have a closer look 
on the referendum day and its data (who voted for what) and study its immediate 
economic consequences for the UK and the EU.  
 
4.1 How did it come to the referendum? 
With the global financial crisis of 2007, and the following turbulences between 2008 and 
2015 in Europe and with the Euro, the British Euroscepticism with its various specifies 
described above peaked.  
Prime Minister Cameron, weakened by an instable inner political situation (Bar, 2017) 
and under pressure of the rising anti-EU mood in his country, already announced in a 
speech that would become known as his EU speech at Bloomberg, on 23 January of 2013, 
to start a debate on a referendum. In this speech he said: 
“It is time for the British people to have their say. It is time to settle this 




will be your decision. And when that choice comes, you will have an 
important choice to make about our country’s destiny”. 
However, Cameron never wanted to leave the EU, his objective has always been a broad 
reformation of the EU. Earlier in this speech, he said:  
“The European Union that emerges from the Eurozone crisis is going 
to be a very different body. It will be transformed perhaps beyond 
recognition by the measures needed to save the Eurozone. We need to 
allow some time for that to happen - and help to shape the future of the 
European Union, so that when the choice comes it will be a real one. 
[...] I believe the best way to do this will be in a new Treaty, so I add 
my voice to those who are already calling for this. My strong 
preference is to enact these changes for the entire EU, not just for 
Britain.” 
The growing Euroscepticism was manifested within the European election of 2014 in the 
UK, where the populist and Europhobic UK Independent Party (UKIP) reached 27.5 
percent, winning the election. It was the first time in 108 years in a nation-wide election 
that a party different to Labour or Conservatives got into first place, a very clear statement 
of the UK’s people.  
After being re-elected as UK’s prime minister in 2015, Cameron kept his promise, and 
sent a reformation proposal to Brussels and initiated the process necessary so that the 
referendum could take place.  In a letter to Donald Tusk, president of the European 
Council, he set out four areas the UK was seeking reforms in: economic governance; 
competitiveness; sovereignty and immigration.23  
It is true that these vague claims were known before and both sides, Brussels and 
Cameron’s government, were playing negotiation games for years already. Disagreement 
 





among the other member states and the hesitation of the British to elaborate a clear wish 
list did not help to bring the matter any further, even though it had been on agenda of the 
European Council in June, October and December of 2015 (Kroll & Leuffen, 2016). 
Furthermore, Kroll and Leuffen (2016) point out: “The nebulosity of the British demands 
can thus be considered a negotiation tactic” and that the “difficulties of achieving 
significant concessions were well-known to the UK government” (p. 1315). 
During the renegotiation process, the European Referendum Act (the legal basis that 
enabled the referendum) was accepted by the House of Commons in June 2015 and 
became royal assent in December 2015.  
What Cameron needed from the renegotiations was something that he could sell as a win 
in the UK, to assure that the British people would vote to stay in the EU in the upcoming 
referendum. He failed. The outcome of the renegotiation was presented in February 2016 
and did not contain fundamental changes: Kroll and Leuffen (2016) stated that “most 
achievements, like, for example the exemption of the UK from further political 
integration, are mainly symbolic. Pleas for better regulation or increased competitiveness 
reflect commonly shared goals. Where substantive issues were on the negotiation table, 
typical compromise solutions emerged” (p. 1316). 
In late February of 2016, Cameron announced that the referendum was being held on 23rd 
of June that same year, and that he would campaign to remain in a reformed EU. 
 
4.2 The Referendum on June 23, 2016 
The Referendum was held in the UK, including Gibraltar. Its legal basis, the European 
Union Referendum Act, did not obligate the government to implement the outcome.  
British, Irish and Commonwealth citizen aged 18 or older and who were resident in the 
UK could register to vote. UK citizens who were resident abroad could also register, given 
that they have been registered to vote in a UK election at least once in the past 15 years.  
In total, 33,577,342 persons did vote, representing a turnout of 72.2 % of the electoral 




remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union”, and could mark 
either the answers: “Remain a member of the European Union” or “Leave the European 
Union”. Nationwide, 48.11 percent (16,141,241 people) voted for remain, while 51.98 
percent (17,410,742 people) voted for leave.24 It should be mentioned that three regions 
and Gibraltar voted different to the nationwide result: London (59.9 % for remain), 
Scotland (62.0 percent for remain), Northern Ireland (55.8 percent for remain) and 
Gibraltar with 95.9 percent for remain (although Gibraltar’s result was incorporated into 
the South-West regional count).  
All analysis on the result that have been made come to a similar conclusion: they primarily 
show a strong division of the British society by social class, age and geography. The 
Leave campaign had its strongest support in economically disadvantaged areas with lower 
average education (Goodwin & Heath, 2016). The Remain voters were more likely higher 
educated, younger and from cities. “In fact, fifteen of the twenty ‘least educated’ areas 
voted to leave the EU, while every single one of the twenty ‘most educated’ areas voted 
to remain” (Goodwin & Heath, 2016, p. 326). 
 









4.3 Political and economic consequences of the referendum  
The outcome of the referendum had no legal consequences (it was not binding to the UK’s 
administrations). However, the most obvious consequence was prime minister May 
presenting formally the UK’s will to leave the EU, initiating the article 50 procedure. 
Apart from that, what other consequences did it have?  
In order to answer this question, in this section, I am going to have a brief look at the 
reactions of European leaders and possible impacts on the evolution of currency rates, 
GDPs and stock markets. 
 
1) Political consequences 
Shortly after the referendum, Cameron stated that he could have won it if the EU leaders 
would have allowed him to control migration. Jean-Claude Juncker, president of the 
European Commission, contested:  
“My impression is that if you over years, if not decades, tell citizens 
that something is wrong with the EU, that the EU is too technocratic, 
too bureaucratic, you cannot be taken by surprise if voters believe 
you”25  
and Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany, said:  
 
25 Retrieved on 25.08.2019 from the Financial Times article “Cameron pins Brexit on EU failure 





“If you wish to have free access to the single market then you have to accept 
the fundamental European rights as well as obligations that come from it. 
This is as true for Great Britain as for anybody else.”26  
These phrases show how deep political trenches are between Brussels and London ever 
since the referendum. 
 
2) Economic consequences 
Since the referendum, the GDP growth rate in the UK has slowed down (see table 2). 
At the same time, the GDP kept growing, on average, quiet constantly within the EU 
(excluded the UK). This could be an indicator that the British slowdown is related to the 
referendum and the Brexit threat. Other economic factors related closely to the GDP have 
also suffered, for instance the productivity: the output per worker has stagnated since 
the referendum (De Lyon & Dhingra, 2019). For further analyses of the expected GDP 
development, see section 4.4 Estimated GDP development for different Brexit scenarios. 
 





Source: own elaboration based on data from the world bank 
 
26 Retrieved on 25.08.2019 from the Independent article “Cameron warns EU immigration rules 
could threaten UK trade deal”, accessible on 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/immigration-fears-caused-brexit-vote-
david-cameron-tells-brussels-a7108516.html. 
Year EU without UK UK 
2014 2,32 2,95 
2015 3,65 2,35 
2016 2,73 1,79 
2017 3,61 1,82 





To see whether the referendum had an influence on the currency exchange rates, I have 
analysed data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on Special Drawing Right 
(SDR) conversion rates. SDRs rates are very helpful in this case, as I want to see the 
possible impact on the currencies in a global context. Charts 4 to 7 show the SDRs per 
currency unit for the Sterling Pound, the Euro and the US Dollar.  
On quarterly average (Chart 4), we can observe a clear fall of the Sterling Pound starting 
in third quarter of 2015. It falls from 1.106 SDRs to 0.9104 SDRs in the fourth quarter of 
2016, losing a lot of ground in relation to the Euro and the US Dollar. There is a lot more 
to be considered in the long-term evolution of a currency, but it is very likely that this 
clear fall is directly related to the Brexit threat and the referendum. From referendum day 
itself, June 23rd of 2016, to the next day (Chart 5), the Sterling Pound fell from 1.0474 to 
0.9492 SDRs; the Euro fell too, although less, from 0.8010 to 0.7915 SDRs and the Dollar 
rose slightly from 0.7033 to 0.7153. With certainty, these events are exclusively caused 
by the referendum.  
It should be mentioned that no significant impact on SDRs rates, other than maybe 
keeping constancy, can be observed by positive political signals since after the 
referendum. I have looked at the days around the agreement on the transition period 
(March 19th, 2018) and the days around the agreement on the (second) delay (April 10th, 





Chart 4: SDRs per currency unit – quarterly average 
Source: own elaboration based on data from the International Monetary Fund. 
 
Chart 5: SDRs per currency unit – daily around referendum 























Chart 6: SDRs per currency unit – daily around agreement on transition period 
(19.03.2018) 
Source: own elaboration based on data from the International Monetary Fund. 
 
Chart 7: SDRs per currency unit – daily around agreement on delay (10.04.2019) 
Source: own elaboration based on data from the International Monetary Fund. 
 
To examine whether the referendum had an influence on the stock markets, I have 
analysed the evolution of the FTSE100, the Ibex35 and the EuroStoxx50. On monthly 






















its outcome. Surprisingly, at the first glance, it even seems that the referendum and 
possible Brexit had a positive effect on the long-term evolution of the British FTSE100. 
However, it is questionable if this rise from January 2016 to January 2018 can be in any 
way related to the Brexit. Certainly, the chart shows that the referendum and its 
outcome did not influence the European Stock markets negatively in the long term. 
Only when looking on the referendum day itself and the day after (chart 9), we can 
observe a clear, but short-term fall of all three stock indexes. The Ibex35 fell 12.4 percent, 
the EuroStoxx50 fell 8.6 percent and the FTSE100 fell 3.1 percent. All of them started to 
recover again three days after the referendum.  
Again, it should be noted that news of the agreement on transmission period and the 
agreement on delay had absolutely no influence on the three stock market indexes 
considered (see chart 10 and 11).  
 
Chart 8: Selected stock market indexes – monthly averages (closing) 
Source: own elaboration based on data from Bolsas y Mercados Españoles for IBEX35, London Stock 



















Chart 9: Selected stock market indexes – daily (closing) around referendum 
Source: own elaboration based on data from Bolsas y Mercados Españoles for IBEX35, London Stock 
Exchange for FTSE100 and investing.com for EuroStoxx50. 
 
Chart 10: Selected stock market indexes – daily (closing) around agreement on 
transition period (19.03.2018) 
Source: own elaboration based on data from Bolsas y Mercados Españoles for IBEX35, London Stock 













































Chart 11: Selected stock market indexes – daily (closing) around agreement on 
delay (10.04.2019) 
Source: own elaboration based on data from Bolsas y Mercados Españoles for IBEX35, London Stock 
Exchange for FTSE100 and investing.com for EuroStoxx50. 
 
4.4 Estimated GDP development for different Brexit scenarios 
In this section, I would like to refer to a 2017 study done by Professor Gabriel Felbermayr 
et. al. of the German ifo institute. They have applied the standard gravitation model of 
Head and Mayer (2014) to determine trade advantages the EU (and other trade agreements 
between the EU and third countries). They have generated and combined them with an 
own “statistical common gravity” simulation model on data of an inter-country input-
output table of the World Input Output Database to estimate the economic effects of 
different Brexit scenarios for the UK and for Europe.  
To outline the macroeconomic possible effects, I would like to show their prediction of 
the impact on the real GDP of four selected scenarios (see Table 3). I have chosen to show 
two scenarios (S1 and S2) that would count as a Hard Brexit and two (S3 and S4) of a 
Soft Brexit. They are described as the following:27 
 
























Scenario S1: The UK leaves the European single market and the custom union, and no 
other free-trade agreement is settled. The common WTO’s most favoured nation (MFN) 
tariff rules are applied between the EU and the UK. The UK also loses all other non-tariff 
advantages of the EU with third countries (for example the one with Korea). Further, non-
tariff trade barriers are re-introduced. This scenario is called 1a in the ifo study. 
Scenario S2: Like S1, but the UK sets ambitious trade agreements with the USA, Canada 
and Japan. These agreements eliminate tariffs and reduce non-tariff trade costs in the 
same way as the EU-Korea trade agreement is currently reducing them. This scenario is 
called 1c in the ifo study. 
Scenario S3: The UK leaves the European single market and custom union, but a modern 
free-trade agreement has been negotiated (and approved) with the EU, which not only 
eliminates tariffs but also includes non-tariff questions (like services, investment etc). 
Therefore, estimated trade-cost reducing effect of the EU-Korea agreement are used in 
the calculation. This scenario is called 2a in the ifo study. 
Scenario S4: This scenario pictures an approximation to a British-EEA membership (like 
Norway or Iceland), which means a higher economic integration than within a free-trade 
agreement. The calculations are based on scenario S3, but the difference in trade-cost 
reducing effects between an ambitious free-trade agreement and an EU membership is 
reduced by another 50 percent. This scenario is called 2b in the ifo study. 
Table 3 on next page shows that any kind of Brexit scenario subject to the analysis 
will have negative effect on British real GDP growth as well as on the one of every 
single EU member state.  
A Soft Brexit, however, will affect the remaining EU members only little. The British 
GDP will decrease between 1.73 % (Hard Brexit) and 0.4 % (Soft Brexit), while the EU-
27 GDP will reduce between 0.26 % and 0.07%. Some remaining member states are more 
effected than others: especially Ireland and Luxemburg suffer the most, with minus 2.03 
% and minus 1.4 % in the hardest Brexit scenario S1, respectively, while Austria and 




Interestingly, in 7 out of 8 scenarios of the referred study, the country with the most 
affected GDP would be Ireland, not the UK. The difference between S1 and S2 is 
surprising too. It seems to be better for the EU-27 when the UK manages to negotiate 
free-trade agreements with other leading economies in the world rather than turn 
into an isolated WTO member.  
 
Table 3: Change of real GDP (in %) 
 Hard Brexit Soft Brexit 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 
UK -1,73 -1,47 -0,57 -0,4 
EU27 -0,26 -0,24 -0,11 -0,07 
Austria  -0,11 -0,12 -0,05 -0,03 
Belgium -0,46 -0,46 -0,2 -0,13 
Bulgaria -0,2 -0,2 -0,11 -0,08 
Croatia -0,11 -0,1 -0,06 -0,04 
Cyprus -0,51 -0,5 -0,23 -0,15 
Czech Republic -0,23 -0,23 -0,09 -0,06 
Denmark -0,31 -0,31 -0,16 -0,1 
Estonia -0,23 -0,23 -0,11 -0,07 
Finland -0,17 -0,17 -0,07 -0,05 
France -0,19 -0,19 -0,09 -0,06 
Germany -0,23 -0,24 -0,1 -0,06 
Greece -0,13 -0,12 -0,07 -0,05 
Hungary -0,24 -0,24 -0,09 -0,06 
Ireland -2,03 -2,03 -0,88 -0,52 
Italy -0,15 -0,15 -0,07 -0,04 
Latvia -0,22 -0,22 -0,1 -0,06 
Lithuania -0,21 -0,21 -0,11 -0,06 
Luxemburg -1,4 -1,44 -0,46 -0,37 
Malta -1,65 -1,6 -0,71 -0,46 
Netherlands -0,44 -0,43 -0,21 -0,14 
Poland -0,27 -0,27 -0,14 -0,08 
Portugal -0,17 -0,17 -0,08 -0,05 
Romania -0,13 -0,13 -0,07 -0,04 
Slovakia -0,35 -0,34 -0,23 -0,15 
Slovenia -0,13 -0,14 -0,07 -0,04 
Spain -0,15 -0,15 -0,07 -0,04 
Sweden -0,26 -0,26 -0,12 -0,08 
Source: own elaboration based on data from the ifo study “Ökonomische Effekte eines Brexit auf 







Chapter 5: Methodology and sources of data  
The data used in the empirical analysis presented in this Project came from different 
information sources. First, the Integrated Tariff of the European Communities (TARIC) 
dataset retrieved from www.datacomex.comercio.es, the official website of the 
Secretary of State on trade of the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Tourism of the Spanish 
Government. The TARIC-code shows the different rules that apply when importing a 
product to the EU. It includes the harmonised system (short HS system, which the WTO 
is using) and the combined nomenclature of the EU custom union, both designed to 
categorize all products in the marked and assigning tariffs and rules to them. 
In a first step and in order to analyse the importance of the UK in the Basque trade I have 
simply compared the TARIC data on the CAPV – UK trade relation to the TARIC data 
on the total CAPV trade (with the world) for the years 2007–2017. Data for 2018 and 
2019 is only provisionally available, that is why I have not included these years into the 
study. 
In a second step, I have downloaded the TARIC data on the CAPV – UK trade relation 
on TARIC-chapter level (chapter 01, 02 … 99) for the years 2013–2017. Then, I have 
aggregated the chapters to 21 sectors and analysed all sectors in 2017. Further, I have 
analysed the evolution of the five most important ones from 2013 to 2017. The sectors do 
not exactly match the 21 TARIC-sections. The denominations of sectors that I used are 
similar to the ones the World Input Output Table Database is using (in Appendix figure 
A4 I present the TARIC-sections assigned to each sector). 
A second source for data was the World Trade Organisation’s data on tariffs, which I 
have used to estimate tariffs that will be applied in the case of a no-deal or Hard Brexit 
scenario (I have called this the “WTO scenario”) and a Soft Brexit scenario called 
“Atlantic  island scenario”. In the WTO scenario, tariffs between the EU and the UK are 
applied under the most favoured nation rule, normally applied to all WTO member states 




is currently the case for the US – EU trade. I have used tariffs the USA has reported in 
2018, assuming the UK will establish the same ones, and the tariffs the EU has reported 
in 2018 to charge on normal WTO members.  
For the Soft Brexit scenario, I have decided to use the tariffs applied in 2018 between 
Iceland and the EU. Despite the different economic structure and size compared to the 
UK, I have chosen Iceland for two reasons: first, it is like Britain an island in the north 
Atlantic Ocean with important fishery, important ties to the US and of strategic 
importance to the NATO. Second, Iceland is member of the EEA, with important 
exclusion on tariffs in the agricultural sector and fishing industry, which are regulated in 
the EU-Iceland agreement. Certainly, it would be a very Soft Brexit, but a quite possible 
one.  
For both scenarios, I took the average tariffs of the HS-code levels two and assigned them 
to the TARIC data from the section above on trade between the Basque Country and the 
UK. Based on the sectoral trade data of 2017, I then calculated the weighted average of 
the tariffs for the 21 sectors. As can be seen in Table 4, one HS subcategory (of 6 digits, 
or level 6) can have various types of tariff lines (TL, min. 8 digits). More to the point, 
there are three types of TL that come along with the WTO data: Ad valorem (AV), non-
AV and Duty-free TL. For example, the subcategory 0104 Live sheep and goats (level 4) 
has five TL: one Duty-free, one AV and three non-AV, charging 80,5 € per 100 kg. In 
total, the HS has over 11.600 tariff lines, theoretically covering all existing products on 
the planet. They are too many to be analysed and presented in a reasonable way. But 
considering the demonstrated different types of tariff lines, does it make any sense to 
calculate an average AV tariff per HS level two, or even per level four? I think it does, 
when giving two relative indicators along with the average: the WTO gives a percentage 
of Duty-free TL per HS level four and two, and I have calculated the AV% validity, 
representing in relative numbers the AV TL per category. For our example of the sheep 
and goats, this means: 
 Average AV Duty (%)  =  (3,2 + 0) / 2 =  1,6 % 
 Indicator of AV% validity  = 2/5  = 0,4  




Table 4: Tariff lines applied by the EU on products from the USA in the HS level 4 
category: 0104 Live sheep and goats 
HS level HS-code Description Tariff   





4 0104 Live sheep and goats  
6 010410 Sheep  
TL 01041010 Pure Breed 0 % 
TL 01041030 Lambs 80,5 € / 100 kg 
TL 01041030 Other 80,5 € / 100 kg 
6 010420 Goats  
TL 01042010 Pure Breed 3,2 % 
TL 01042090 Other 80,5 € / 100 kg 








Chapter 6: Analysis of commercial relations between the ACBC and the UK 
 
6.1 Analysis of total trade between ACBC and the UK 
The UK is an important trade partner for the Basque Country, in exports and in imports. 
It was among the top five most important trade partners for the Basque Country in almost 
all years of the period under study (2012 – 2017) (see Table 4 in previous section).  
In exports, the UK is most years on the fourth position, after France, Germany and the 
USA. In imports, in turn, UK is on the third position in 2017 and 2015, on the fourth in 
2014. In three of the years (2012, 2013, 2016), the UK is not presented in the top five 
import partners. Other important import partners for the Basque Country are Germany, 
France, Russia and especially in the most recent years, China.  
 
Table 5: The 5 most important trade partners of the CAPV from 2012 to 2017, 
with the weight of trade with them relative to total trade inside parenthesis, in % 
Source: own elaboration based on data from www.datacomex.comercio.es 
Note: DEU (Germany), FRA (France), USA (United States of America), GBR (Great 
Britain), ITA (Italy), CHN (China), RUS (Russia) 








2017 DEU (15,7) FRA (15,6) USA (7,5) GBR (6,3) ITA (4,6) 
2016 FRA (16,7) DEU (15,5) USA (7,1) GBR (6,1) ITA (4,9) 
2015 FRA (16,6) DEU (14,7) USA (7,9) GBR (6,5) ITA (5,3) 
2014 FRA (15,6) DEU (13,8) USA (7,6) GBR (6,2) NLD (5,4) 
2013 FRA (16,8) DEU (14,4) USA (7,2) GBR (5,9) ITA (4,5) 
2012 FRA (17,8) DEU (14,2) GBR (6,7) USA (6,3) ITA (4,6) 







2017 DEU (15,0) FRA (9,8) GBR (7,1) CHN (5,6) ITA (5,0) 
2016 DEU (16,8) FRA (10,4) RUS (7,2) CHN (6,7) ITA (5,6) 
2015 DEU (14,2) FRA (10,6) GBR (10,4) CHN (7,0) RUS (5,0) 
2014 DEU (11,7) FRA (9,4) RUS (9,3) GBR  (8,9) CHN (5,5) 
2013 RUS (15,3) DEU (11,9) FRA (10,3) MEX (6,2) CHN (5,1) 





More precisely, the Basque exports were superior to 1.2 billion Euro (current prices) in 
eight out of 10 years between 2007 and 2017, representing between 5.4 and 6.5 % of all 
exports (Table 5). Excluding the years 2014 and 2015, the Basque Country has a positive 
trade Balance with the UK in this period subject to analysis. The imports from the UK 
oscillate between 0.5 and 1.7 billion euros, or 3.3 and 10.4 % of all trade. It should be 
mentioned that the extraordinary increase of 2014 and 2015 are due to the energy sector, 
where imports rose from 10 million Euros in 2013 to over a billion in 2014. 
 
Table 6: Basque Country’s trade with the UK in million €, and its relative 
importance to the total Basque Country’s trade (in %) 
Year Export % of tot. Ex. Import % of tot. Im. 
2007 1.239,3 6,5 1.149,4 6,1 
2008 1.259,7 6,2 934,7 4,6 
2009 804,4 5,4 547,6 4,5 
2010 981,4 5,5 785,9 5,1 
2011 1.226,2 6,0 802,5 4,6 
2012 1.407,6 6,7 556,8 3,5 
2013 1.214,0 5,9 527,6 3,3 
2014 1.384,5 6,2 1.518,1 8,9 
2015 1.416,9 6,5 1.743,3 10,4 
2016 1.308,4 6,1 827,3 5,3 
2017 1.519,6 6,3 1.328,4 7,1 
Source: own elaboration based on data from www.datacomex.comercio.es 
 
6.2 Analysis of sectoral trade 
1) Exports to the UK 
The Autonomous Community of the Basque Country is a highly industrialized region, 
with a strong focus on metal fabricates, machinery and vehicles and parts therefor. This 




the UK for each sector for 2017, the most recent year of available final data. Most 
important sectors28 were Manufacture of motor vehicles and trailers (including parts 
therefor), with over 527 million euros, followed by manufacture of basic metals (240 
million), machinery and equipment (215 million), fabricated metal products (122 million) 
and rubber and plastic products (121 million). These five sectors counted in 2017 for 80.6 
percentage of all Basque exports to the UK.  
 
Table 7: Sectoral Basque exports to the UK in 2017 (million €), and their weight in 
all exports of the sector (%) 
Sector Million € Weight (%)  
Manufacture of motor vehicles and trailers 527,1 8,70 
Manufacture of basic metals 239,7 8,96 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 214,6 6,43 
Man. of fabricated metal products, except machinery & equipment 122,4 4,42 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 120,8 7,89 
Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco products 81,1 12,45 
Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products  40,6 1,79 
Manufacture of electrical equipment 33,2 2,54 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products and glass 32,1 7,93 
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 19,6 11,80 
Manufacture of other transport equipment 16,5 1,96 
Crop and animal production, hunting and related service activities 15,7 22,54 
Manufacture of paper and paper products 15,0 2,54 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  14,3 2,56 
Forestry and logging; manufacture of wood and of products of 
wood and cork, except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw 
and plaiting materials 
10,9 10,08 
Precious metal and other manufacture; including jewellery, arts, 
watches and toys 
6,8 3,38 
Textiles, Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel and leather 
products 3,4 2,55 
Manufacture of furniture 2,9 2,22 
Printing and reproduction of recorded media 1,4 5,13 
Fishing and aquaculture 1,3 0,58 
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical 
preparations 
0,3 0,53 
TOTAL 1.519,6 6,30 
Source: own elaboration based on data from datacomex.comercio.es 
 





As it can be seen in Chart 12, these sectors have been the most important ones constantly 
over the last couple of years, with over 100 million euros in most cases. A rise in the 
motor vehicles an trailers sector can be observed, starting in 2015, while the other sectors 
were declining slightly (taking in account that values are in current prices).  
 
Chart 12: Evolution of Basque exports to the UK per sector, in million € 
Source: own elaboration based on data from datacomex.comercio.es 
 
2) Imports from the UK 
The ACBC imports primarily coke and refined petroleum product (including gas) from 
the UK (see Table 8). The imports worth 800 million Euros of this single sector in 2017 
represented 60.2 percentage of all imports from the UK in that year. It was followed by 
the manufacture of basic metal sector with 231 million Euros, the manufacture of 
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Manufacture of basic metals
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
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Table 8: Sectoral Basque imports from the UK in 2017 (million €), and their weight 
in all imports of the sector (%) 
Sector Million € Weight (%)  
Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products  799,6 1,59 
Manufacture of basic metals 231,3 12,32 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 94,8 0,25 
Fishing and aquaculture 43,0 1,78 
Manufacture of electrical equipment 26,4 0,30 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 23,8 0,70 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  20,7 10,14 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and 
equipment 
18,5 15,96 
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 15,4 1,74 
Manufacture of motor vehicles and trailers 14,3 0,66 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products and glass 11,8 2,52 
Manufacture of other transport equipment 10,3 3,82 
Textiles, Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel and leather 
products 
6,2 7,83 
Crop and animal production, hunting and related service activities 3,3 1,99 
Manufacture of paper and paper products 2,7 5,59 
Precious metal and other manufacture; including jewellery, arts, 
watches and toys 
2,2 2,42 
Manufacture of furniture 1,5 4,03 
Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco products 1,4 1,22 
Printing and reproduction of recorded media 0,7 7,03 
Forestry and logging; manufacture of wood and of products of 
wood and cork, except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw 
and plaiting materials 
0,3 1,15 
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical 
preparations 
0,3 1,19 
TOTAL 1.328,4 7,11 
Source: own elaboration based on data from datacomex.comercio.es 
 
As shown in Chart 13, this has been very different before 2014. In 2013, for example, the 
imports from the UK of coke and refined petroleum product have only amounted to about 
10 million Euros, before increasing a 10,000 percent to over a billion in 2014. Before 
2014, the manufacture of basic metal, now on second place, has been by far the most 
importing sector from the UK, followed by machinery and equipment, fishery, chemicals 





Chart 13: Evolution of Basque imports from the UK per sector, in million € 
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Chapter 7: Effects of Brexit 
 
7.1 Expected tariffs in the “WTO scenario” 
In the “WTO scenario”, Basque companies working in the textile and leather products 
sector will be most affected, in exports (see Table 9) and in imports (Table 10). They 
must expect an average ad valorem (AV) duty of 9.13% on their exports to the UK, and 
of 9.09% on their imports from the UK. In both cases, the AV duties are very accurate 
(the indicator of the AV validity is 0.93 and 1), and only very few Duty-free product are 
granted (the duty-free indicator is 0.13 in exports, and 0.03 in imports). 
Exporting companies of crop and animal production must expect an average AV duty of 
8.38%, with very few duty-free products granted. The AV validity is little (0.46), which 
means a lot of non-AV duties are going to be applied29. This sector will also be 
significantly affected in imports, with an average AV duty of 4.93 percent. Like in 
exports, validity is quiet low (0.53) and few duty-free products are granted (0.27). 
Exporting companies of the important Basque manufacture of motor vehicle sector should 
expect an average AV duty of 3.09 percent of absolute validity, although with almost half 
of products duty-free granted (0.49). The sector is going to be more affected in imports, 
where the average AV duty will be 6.19 percent of total validity and very few duty-free 
products granted (0.09). 
Basque companies working in the sector of food products, beverages and tobacco will be 
affected with an AV duty of 2.79% in exports, and 9.8% in imports. Again, in exports and 
imports, there are a lot of non-AV duties applied, discriminating quality products lesser 
than low quality ones.  
 
29 In general, non-AV duties like, for example, 90 Sterling Pounds per 100 kg, enhance the trade 





The fishing and aquaculture sector is taking a special position within the tariff regimes. 
Basque companies exporting fish to the UK don’t have to expect a lot of tariffs, in this 
scenario. A lot of products are going to be duty-free (indicator of 0.88), and the ones 
going to be charged have a high valid 0.5% AV duty. On the other side, in imports it’s 
completely different: 10.8 percent average AV duty, the highest of all the EU is charging, 
and very few products are duty-free (indicator 0.06).  
Two other sectors are going to be strongly affected in imports, but only little in exports: 
manufacture of rubber and plastic products, with 5.33% average AV duty on imports, and 
manufacture of chemicals with 4.81% on imports. On exports, 2.08% and 2.66% are to 
be expected, respectively.  
Products of the paper industry and printing and reproduction sector will neither be 
affected in exports nor in imports (100 percent duty-free, in both cases). Companies of 
the pharmaceutical sector must expect 0.2% average AV duty on very few products (duty-





Table 9: Expected Ad valorem tariffs for Basque Country’s exports to the UK in 









Textiles, Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel and 
leather products 
9,13 0,93 0,13 
Crop and animal production, hunting and related service 
activities 
8,38 0,46 0,13 
Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco 
products 
2,79 0,54 0,36 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  2,66 0,99 0,42 
Forestry and logging; manufacture of wood and of 
products of wood and cork, except furniture; 
manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials 
1,55 0,85 0,48 
Manufacture of motor vehicles and trailers 3,09 1,00 0,49 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 2,08 1,00 0,49 
Manufacture of electrical equipment 1,40 1,00 0,54 
Precious metal and other manufacture; including 
jewellery, arts, watches and toys 
2,10 0,98 0,56 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and equipment 
1,74 0,95 0,59 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 1,25 1,00 0,65 
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical 
products 1,00 0,98 0,67 
Manufacture of furniture 1,60 1,00 0,69 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products and 
glass 
1,53 0,98 0,72 
Manufacture of basic metals 1,02 1,00 0,74 
Manufacture of other transport equipment 1,48 1,00 0,77 
Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products  0,50 0,61 0,85 
Fishing and aquaculture 0,50 0,97 0,88 
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and 
pharmaceutical preparations 
0,20 1,00 0,97 
Manufacture of paper and paper products 0,00 1,00 1,00 
Printing and reproduction of recorded media 0,00 1,00 1,00 





Table 10: Expected Ad valorem tariffs for Basque Country’s imports from the UK 









Textiles, Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel and 
leather products 
9,09 1,00 0,03 
Fishing and aquaculture 10,80 1,00 0,06 
Manufacture of other transport equipment 2,12 1,00 0,08 
Manufacture of motor vehicles and trailers 6,19 1,00 0,09 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 5,53 1,00 0,10 
Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco 
products 
9,80 0,55 0,11 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  4,81 0,98 0,14 
Precious metal and other manufacture; including 
jewellery, arts, watches and toys 
2,48 1,00 0,19 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 1,78 1,00 0,24 
Manufacture of electrical equipment 2,36 1,00 0,27 
Crop and animal production, hunting and related service 
activities 
4,93 0,53 0,27 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and equipment 
2,12 1,00 0,31 
Manufacture of furniture 2,40 1,00 0,38 
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical 
products 
1,45 1,00 0,50 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products and 
glass 
1,67 0,99 0,55 
Forestry and logging; manufacture of wood and of 
products of wood and cork, except furniture; 
manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials 
1,74 1,00 0,67 
Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products  0,80 1,00 0,71 
Manufacture of basic metals 1,11 1,00 0,78 
Manufacture of paper and paper products 0,00 1,00 1,00 
Printing and reproduction of recorded media 0,00 1,00 1,00 
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and 
pharmaceutical preparations 
0,00 1,00 1,00 





7.2 Expected tariffs in the “Atlantic island” scenario 
As the EEA agreement is part of this scenario, no tariffs will be applied on most sectors, 
except the agricultural and fishery sectors. In exports (see Table 11), the sector of food 
products, beverages and tobacco must expect a 1.2% average AV duty, although with a 
high indicator of duty-free tariff lines (0.87). The crop and animal production sector must 
expect a 2.59% average AV duty, with an even higher duty-free indicator (0.92). In 
imports (see Table 12), the fishing industry will be most affected, with a 3.58% average 
AV duty of absolute validity and few products granted duty-free. Then follows the food 
products, beverages and tobacco sector with significant 3.81% average AV duty and the 
crop and animal production sector with 1.02%, although having a high duty-free indicator 
of 0.85.   
 
Table 11: Expected Ad valorem tariffs for Basque Country’s exports to the UK in 









Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco 
products 
1,20 0,88 0,87 
Crop and animal production, hunting and related service 
activities 
2,59 0,97 0,92 
Forestry and logging; manufacture of wood and of 
products of wood and cork, except furniture; 
manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials 
0,00 0,98 0,98 
Rest of sectors 0,00 1,00 1,00 





Table 12: Expected Ad valorem tariffs for Basque Country’s imports from the UK 









Fishing and aquaculture 3,58 1,00 0,20 
Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco 
products 
3,81 0,59 0,52 
Crop and animal production, hunting and related service 
activities 
1,02 0,88 0,85 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  0,06 0,98 0,98 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products and 
glass 
0,02 0,99 0,99 
Rest of sectors 0,00 1,00 1,00 







This aim of this Project is to advance in the understanding of the historical factors that 
fuelled process of the Brexit and to analyse the potential economic effects that the UK 
leave could have for the (ACBC). In order to do so, first, I have analysed the historical 
trajectory of the relationship between the UK and the EU in political and economic terms 
since the foundation of the EU until the Brexit negotiations between both parts. I have 
studied the evolution of the commercial relationship between the UK and the Basque 
country. Second, I have roughly estimated the potential effects of the Brexit under 
different scenarios.  
I have found out that the Brexit threat and the outcome of the UK referendum on leaving 
the EU have left deep political tranches between London and Brussel. The GDP growth-
rate in the UK has slowed down since the referendum, more than it did on mainland 
Europe (where it even grew in some years), the output per worker has stagnated. A clear 
long-term fall of the Sterling Pound relative to the Euro and the US dollar can be 
observed: from 1,107 SDRs in first quarter of 2015 to 0,928 SDRs in second quarter of 
2019. However, the referendum and its outcome did not influence European stock 
markets negatively in the long-term. It seems that positive political news on the Brexit do 
not affect the development of currencies or stocks anymore: neither the agreement of 
2018 on a transition period nor the agreements on delaying Brexit did influence them at 
all.  
Any kind of Brexit will have a negative impact on British real GDP growth as well as on 
the one of each remaining EU member state, although a soft Brexit will affect the 
remaining EU only little. Interestingly, in almost any Brexit scenario, the most affected 
state will be Ireland, not the UK. In case of a hard Brexit, it seems to be better for the 
remaining EU members if the UK manages to negotiate free trade agreements with other 
leading economies in the world rather than turn into an isolated WTO member. 
Further, I have found out that for the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country, 
the UK is a constant, very important trade partner. For example, in 2017, the last year of 
available official data, it was the fourth most important country for exports, and the third 




which represented 6,3 percentage of all exports of the autonomous community. Imports 
amounted to 1,3 billion Euros, representing 7,1 percentage of all imports. The most 
important Basque sectors in exports to the UK are: manufacture of motor vehicles and 
trailers, manufacture of basic metals, manufacture of machinery and equipment, 
manufacture of fabricated metal products and manufacture of rubber and plastic products. 
Exports of these five sectors counted for 80,6 % of all exports to the UK in 2017. The 
imports were primarily of coke and refined petroleum (60,2 percentage), followed by the 
sectors of basic metals and machinery equipment. 
In the “WTO scenario”, a very hard Brexit scenario, tariffs will apply on all exporting 
sectors except for the paper and paper products, and printing and reproduction of recorded 
media sectors. Most affected Basque companies will be the ones exporting textiles, 
wearing apparel and leather products crop and animal products and motor vehicles and 
trailers. The most affected sectors in the Basque Country by import discrimination from 
the UK will be fishing and aquaculture, food products, beverages and tobacco and again 
textiles, wearing apparel and leather products manufacture of motor vehicles and trailers  
If the UK opts for a very Soft Brexit, for example for a similar status Iceland has right 
now within the EEA but important exclusions in fisheries and agriculture, Basque 
companies of the crop and animal production must expect a 2,59 percentage AV duty 
only on very few of their products, and of food, beverages and tobacco products only 1,2 
percentage. The rest will be duty-free. 
In imports, the fishing and aquaculture sector will suffer the most tariff discrimination. 
Some food products, beverages and tobacco products and crop and animal production 
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Figure A1. The European Maritime and Fisheries Fund. 2014-2020 
Source: European Commission. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/emff_en on 




Figure A2. EMFF Financial allocation per member state (2014 – 2020) 
Source: European Commission. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/emff_en on 





Figure A3. Article 50 of the Treaty on the European Union30 
 
Article 50 
1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own 
constitutional requirements. 
2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its 
intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall 
negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its 
withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. 
That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the 
Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European 
Parliament. 
3.   The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into 
force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred 
to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State 
concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period. 
4.   For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council or of 
the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the 
discussions of the European Council or Council or in decisions concerning it. 
A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union. 
5.   If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be 
subject to the procedure referred to in Article 49.  
 
30 Source: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12016M050, 




Figure A4. Composition of sectors 
Nr. Sector TARIC (level 2) code and description 
1 Crop and animal 
production, hunting and 
related service activities 
01 LIVE ANIMALS  
02 MEAT AND EDIBLE MEAT OFFAL  
04 DAIRY PRODUCE; BIRDS' EGGS; NATURAL HONEY; 
EDIBLE PRODUCTS OF ANIMAL ORIGIN, NOT 
ELSEWHERE SPECIFIED OR INCLUDED  
05 PRODUCTS OF ANIMAL ORIGIN, NOT ELSEWHERE 
SPECIFIED OR INCLUDED  
10 CEREALS 
11 PRODUCTS OF THE MILLING INDUSTRY; MALT; 
STARCHES; INULIN; WHEAT GLUTEN  
12 OIL SEEDS AND OLEAGINOUS FRUITS; 
MISCELLANEOUS GRAINS, SEEDS AND FRUIT; 
INDUSTRIAL OR MEDICINAL PLANTS; STRAW AND 
FODDER  
07 EDIBLE VEGETABLES AND CERTAIN ROOTS AND 
TUBERS  
08 EDIBLE FRUIT AND NUTS; PEEL OF CITRUS FRUIT OR 
MELONS  
09 COFFEE, TEA, MATÉ AND SPICES  
    
2 Fishing and aquaculture 03 FISH AND CRUSTACEANS, MOLLUSCS AND OTHER 
AQUATIC INVERTEBRATES  
    
3 Manufacture of food 
products, beverages and 
tobacco products 
13 LAC; GUMS, RESINS AND OTHER VEGETABLE SAPS 
AND EXTRACTS  
15 ANIMAL OR VEGETABLE FATS AND OILS AND THEIR 
CLEAVAGE PRODUCTS; PREPARED EDIBLE FATS; 
ANIMAL OR VEGETABLE WAXES  
16 PREPARATIONS OF MEAT, OF FISH OR OF 
CRUSTACEANS, MOLLUSCS OR OTHER AQUATIC 
INVERTEBRATES  
17 SUGARS AND SUGAR CONFECTIONERY  
18 COCOA AND COCOA PREPARATIONS  
19 PREPARATIONS OF CEREALS, FLOUR, STARCH OR 
MILK; PASTRYCOOKS' PRODUCTS  
20 PREPARATIONS OF VEGETABLES, FRUIT, NUTS OR 
OTHER PARTS OF PLANTS  
21 MISCELLANEOUS EDIBLE PREPARATIONS  
22 BEVERAGES, SPIRITS AND VINEGAR  
23 RESIDUES AND WASTE FROM THE FOOD INDUSTRIES; 
PREPARED ANIMAL FODDER  
24 TOBACCO AND MANUFACTURED TOBACCO 
SUBSTITUTES  




4 Textiles, manufacture of 
textiles, wearing apparel 
and leather products 
41 RAW HIDES AND SKINS (OTHER THAN FURSKINS) AND 
LEATHER   
42 ARTICLES OF LEATHER; SADDLERY AND HARNESS; 
TRAVEL GOODS, HANDBAGS AND SIMILAR 
CONTAINERS; ARTICLES OF ANIMAL GUT (OTHER 
THAN SILKWORM GUT)  
43 FURSKINS AND ARTIFICIAL FUR; MANUFACTURES 
THEREOF 
50 SILK 
51 WOOL, FINE OR COARSE ANIMAL HAIR; HORSEHAIR 
YARN AND WOVEN FABRIC  
52 COTTON 
53 OTHER VEGETABLE TEXTILE FIBRES; PAPER YARN 
AND WOVEN FABRICS OF PAPER YARN   
56 WADDING, FELT AND NONWOVENS; SPECIAL YARNS; 
TWINE, CORDAGE, ROPES AND CABLES AND ARTICLES 
THEREOF  
57 CARPETS AND OTHER TEXTILE FLOOR COVERINGS  
58 SPECIAL WOVEN FABRICS; TUFTED TEXTILE FABRICS; 
LACE; TAPESTRIES; TRIMMINGS; EMBROIDERY  
59 IMPREGNATED, COATED, COVERED OR LAMINATED 
TEXTILE FABRICS; TEXTILE ARTICLES OF A KIND 
SUITABLE FOR INDUSTRIAL USE  
60 KNITTED OR CROCHETED FABRICS  
61 ARTICLES OF APPAREL AND CLOTHING ACCESSORIES, 
KNITTED OR CROCHETED  
62 ARTICLES OF APPAREL AND CLOTHING ACCESSORIES, 
NOT KNITTED OR CROCHETED  
63 OTHER MADE-UP TEXTILE ARTICLES; SETS; WORN 
CLOTHING AND WORN TEXTILE ARTICLES; RAGS 
64 FOOTWEAR, GAITERS AND THE LIKE; PARTS OF SUCH 
ARTICLES  
65 HEADGEAR AND PARTS THEREOF  
    
5 Forestry; manufacture of 
wood and of products of 
wood and cork, except 
furniture; manufacture of 
articles of straw and 
plaiting materials 
06 LIVE TREES AND OTHER PLANTS; BULBS, ROOTS AND 
THE LIKE; CUT FLOWERS AND ORNAMENTAL 
FOLIAGE  
14 VEGETABLE PLAITING MATERIALS; VEGETABLE 
PRODUCTS NOT ELSEWHERE SPECIFIED OR INCLUDED  
44 WOOD AND ARTICLES OF WOOD; WOOD CHARCOAL 
45 CORK AND ARTICLES OF CORK   
46 MANUFACTURES OF STRAW, OF ESPARTO OR OF 
OTHER PLAITING MATERIALS; BASKETWARE AND 
WICKERWORK  
    
6 Manufacture of paper and 
paper products 
47 PULP OF WOOD OR OF OTHER FIBROUS CELLULOSIC 
MATERIAL; RECOVERED (WASTE AND SCRAP) PAPER 
OR PAPERBOARD  
48 PAPER AND PAPERBOARD; ARTICLES OF PAPER PULP, 




7 Printing and reproduction 
of recorded media 
49 PRINTED BOOKS, NEWSPAPERS, PICTURES AND OTHER 
PRODUCTS OF THE PRINTING INDUSTRY; 
MANUSCRIPTS, TYPESCRIPTS AND PLANS   
  
    
8 Manufacture of coke and 
refined petroleum products  
27 MINERAL FUELS, MINERAL OILS AND PRODUCTS OF 
THEIR DISTILLATION; BITUMINOUS SUBSTANCES; 
MINERAL WAXES   
  
    
9 Manufacture of chemicals 
and chemical products  
28 INORGANIC CHEMICALS; ORGANIC OR INORGANIC 
COMPOUNDS OF PRECIOUS METALS, OF RARE-EARTH 
METALS, OF RADIOACTIVE ELEMENTS OR OF 
ISOTOPES  
29 ORGANIC CHEMICALS  
31 FERILISERS 
32 TANNING OR DYEING EXTRACTS; TANNINS AND 
THEIR DERIVATIVES; DYES, PIGMENTS AND OTHER 
COLOURING MATTER; PAINTS AND VARNISHES; 
PUTTY AND OTHER MASTICS; INKS  
33 ESSENTIAL OILS AND RESINOIDS; PERFUMERY, 
COSMETIC OR TOILET PREPARATIONS   
34 SOAP, ORGANIC SURFACE-ACTIVE AGENTS, WASHING 
PREPARATIONS, LUBRICATING PREPARATIONS, 
ARTIFICIAL WAXES, PREPARED WAXES, POLISHING OR 
SCOURING PREPARATIONS, CANDLES AND SIMILAR 
ARTICLES, MODELLING PASTES, ‘DENTAL WAXES’ 
AND DENTAL PREPARATIONS WITH A BASIS OF 
PLASTER   
35 ALBUMINOIDAL SUBSTANCES; MODIFIED STARCHES; 
GLUES; ENZYMES   
36 EXPLOSIVES; PYROTECHNIC PRODUCTS; MATCHES; 
PYROPHORIC ALLOYS; CERTAIN COMBUSTIBLE 
PREPARATIONS   
37 PHOTOGRAPHIC OR CINEMATOGRAPHIC GOODS   
38 MISCELLANEOUS CHEMICAL PRODUCTS   
    









    
11 Manufacture of rubber, 
plastic products and 
synthetic textiles 
39 PLASTICS AND ARTICLES THEREOF 
40 RUBBER AND ARTICLES THEREOF 
54 MAN-MADE FILAMENTS; STRIP AND THE LIKE OF 
MAN-MADE TEXTILE MATERIALS  
55 MAN-MADE STAPLE FIBRES   
    
12 Manufacture of other non-
metallic mineral products 
and glass 
25 SALT; SULPHUR; EARTHS AND STONE; PLASTERING 
MATERIALS, LIME AND CEMENT  




68 ARTICLES OF STONE, PLASTER, CEMENT, ASBESTOS, 
MICA OR SIMILAR MATERIALS  
69 CERAMIC PRODUCTS  
70 GLASS AND GLASSWARE  
    
13 Manufacture of basic 
metals 
72 IRON AND STEEL  
74 COPPER AND ARTICLES THEREOF  
75 NICKEL AND ARTICLES THEREOF  
76 ALUMINIUM AND ARTICLES THEREOF  
78 LEAD AND ARTICLES THEREOF  
79 ZINC AND ARTICLES THEREOF   
80 TIN AND ARTICLES THEREOF  
81 OTHER BASE METALS; CERMETS; ARTICLES THEREOF   
    
14 Manufacture of fabricated 
metal products, except 
machinery and equipment 
73 ARTICLES OF IRON OR STEEL  
82 TOOLS, IMPLEMENTS, CUTLERY, SPOONS AND FORKS, 
OF BASE METAL; PARTS THEREOF OF BASE METAL  
83 MISCELLANEOUS ARTICLES OF BASE METAL  
93 ARMS AND AMMUNITION; PARTS AND ACCESSORIES 
THEREOF  
    
15 Manufacture of computer, 
electronic and optical 
products 
90 OPTICAL, PHOTOGRAPHIC, CINEMATOGRAPHIC, 
MEASURING, CHECKING, PRECISION, MEDICAL OR 
SURGICAL INSTRUMENTS AND APPARATUS; PARTS 
AND ACCESSORIES THEREOF   
  
    
16 Manufacture of electrical 
equipment 
85 ELECTRICAL MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT AND 
PARTS THEREOF; SOUND RECORDERS AND 
REPRODUCERS, TELEVISION IMAGE AND SOUND 
RECORDERS AND REPRODUCERS, AND PARTS AND 
ACCESSORIES OF SUCH ARTICLES   
  
    
17 Manufacture of machinery 
and equipment n.e.c. 
84 NUCLEAR REACTORS; BOILERS, MACHINERY AND 
MECHANICAL APPLIANCES; PARTS THEREOF   
  
    
18 Manufacture of motor 
vehicles and trailers 
87 VEHICLES OTHER THAN RAILWAY OR TRAMWAY 




    
19 Manufacture of other 
transport equipment 
86 RAILWAY OR TRAMWAY LOCOMOTIVES, ROLLING 
STOCK AND PARTS THEREOF; RAILWAY OR 
TRAMWAY TRACK FIXTURES AND FITTINGS AND 
PARTS THEREOF; MECHANICAL (INCLUDING 
ELECTROMECHANICAL) TRAFFIC SIGNALLING 




88 AIRCRAFT, SPACECRAFT, AND PARTS THEREOF  
89 SHIPS, BOATS AND FLOATING STRUCTURES  
    
20 Manufacture of furniture 94 FURNITURE; BEDDING, MATTRESSES, MATTRESS 
SUPPORTS, CUSHIONS AND SIMILAR STUFFED 
FURNISHINGS; LAMPS AND LIGHTING FITTINGS, NOT 
ELSEWHERE SPECIFIED OR INCLUDED; ILLUMINATED 
SIGNS, ILLUMINATED NAMEPLATES AND THE LIKE; 
PREFABRICATED BUILDINGS  
    
21 Precious metals and other 
manufacture; including 
jewellery, arts, watches 
and toys 
66 UMBRELLAS, SUN UMBRELLAS, WALKING STICKS, 
SEAT-STICKS, WHIPS, RIDING-CROPS AND PARTS 
THEREOF  
67 PREPARED FEATHERS AND DOWN AND ARTICLES 
MADE OF FEATHERS OR OF DOWN; ARTIFICIAL 
FLOWERS; ARTICLES OF HUMAN HAIR  
71 NATURAL OR CULTURED PEARLS, PRECIOUS OR SEMI-
PRECIOUS STONES, PRECIOUS METALS, METALS CLAD 
WITH PRECIOUS METAL, AND ARTICLES THEREOF; 
IMITATION JEWELLERY; COIN  
91 CLOCKS AND WATCHES AND PARTS THEREOF  
92 MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS; PARTS AND ACCESSORIES 
OF SUCH ARTICLES  
95 TOYS, GAMES AND SPORTS REQUISITES; PARTS AND 
ACCESSORIES THEREOF  
96 MISCELLANEOUS MANUFACTURED ARTICLES  
97 WORKS OF ART, COLLECTORS' PIECES AND ANTIQUES  
98 COMPLETE INDUSTRIAL PLANT  
99 SPECIAL COMBINED NOMENCLATURE CODES  





Figure A5. Basque Country’s trade balance with the world, in million € 
Source: own elaboration based on data from www.datacomex.comercio.es 
 
  
Year Export Import Saldo  
2007 19.072,4 18.900,4 172,0 
2008 20.279,2 20.117,4 161,8 
2009 14.942,2 12.294,2 2.648,1 
2010 17.874,5 15.430,3 2.444,3 
2011 20.487,3 17.308,7 3.178,6 
2012 20.970,8 15.822,3 5.148,6 
2013 20.631,3 15.951,8 4.679,6 
2014 22.501,1 17.131,4 5.369,6 
2015 21.865,5 16.818,8 5.046,7 
2016 21.615,4 15.583,4 6.032,0 




Figure A6. 2013 – 2017 Basque Country’s average yearly exports to the UK 
Sector Mill. € 
Manufacture of motor vehicles and trailers 339,0 
Manufacture of basic metals 204,2 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 166,7 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 106,0 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 96,4 
Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco products 59,5 
Manufacture of electrical equipment 31,6 
Manufacture of paper and paper products 21,7 
Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products  20,4 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products and glass 19,5 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  19,3 
Manufacture of other transport equipment 19,0 
Crop and animal production, hunting and related service activities 9,8 
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 8,4 
Forestry and logging; manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, 
except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials 
6,0 
Precious metal and other manufacture; including jewellery, arts, watches and toys 4,9 
Textiles, Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel and leather products 2,6 
Manufacture of furniture 2,4 
Printing and reproduction of recorded media 1,8 
Fishing and aquaculture 1,3 
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations 0,2 
TOTAL 1.140,6 






Figure A7. 2013 - 2017 Basque Country’s average yearly imports from the UK 
Sector Mill. € 
Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products  574,7 
Manufacture of basic metals 184,0 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 67,9 
Fishing and aquaculture 30,3 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  22,9 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 17,8 
Manufacture of electrical equipment 17,3 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 14,1 
Manufacture of motor vehicles and trailers 12,8 
Manufacture of other transport equipment 9,6 
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 9,2 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products and glass 8,6 
Textiles, Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel and leather products 5,3 
Manufacture of paper and paper products 4,6 
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations 2,7 
Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco products 2,5 
Crop and animal production, hunting and related service activities 2,2 
Precious metal and other manufacture; including jewellery, arts, watches and toys 1,9 
Manufacture of furniture 1,4 
Forestry and logging; manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, 
except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials 0,6 
Printing and reproduction of recorded media 0,5 
TOTAL 990,8 
Source: own elaboration based on data from www.datacomex.comercio.es 
 
